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Abstract. We study the impact of sovereign risk on the credit risk of the non-financial corporate sector in 
the Eurozone using credit default swap data. We show that an increase in sovereign credit spreads is 
associated with a statistically and economically significant increase in corporate spreads and, hence, firms’ 
borrowing costs. A deterioration in a country’s credit quality affects more adversely firms that are more 
likely to benefit from government aid, those whose sales are more concentrated in the domestic market, 
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1. Introduction 
The European debt crisis that followed the 2007–2009 financial crisis raised a number of concerns 
regarding the steadily growing level of sovereign risk and its consequences for the real economy. In recent 
years academics, as well as market participants and regulators, have devoted great efforts to identifying 
the determinants of sovereign risk.
1
  In this paper we focus instead on how variations in sovereign 
creditworthiness have affected the credit risk of the non-financial corporate sector in the Eurozone. This 
issue bears important consequences on firms’ access to financial markets and, in turn, on corporate 
borrowing costs.  
The rationale behind the spillover from sovereign to corporate credit risk is the so-called “transfer 
risk”: A government in financial distress is likely to shift the debt burden onto the corporate sector by 
increasing corporate taxation, imposing foreign exchange controls, and, under extreme circumstances, 
expropriating private investments. A rich empirical literature documents the presence of transfer risk in 
emerging economies, where concerns about sovereign creditworthiness have traditionally been more 
pressing.
2
 However, a significant linkage between sovereign risk and corporate credit risk is not granted a 
priori for developed countries. This is especially true in the context of the Eurozone, where two channels 
through which sovereign risk is commonly transferred (i.e., currency controls and the expropriation of 
private investments) are ruled out.  
Following the recent wave of sovereign downgrades in developed economies, the investigation of 
transfer risk has extended beyond emerging markets. Special attention has been devoted to the financial 
sector where the sovereign-corporate link is expected to be tight: Banks benefit from government bailouts 
                                                          
1
 Caceres, Guzzo, and Segoviano (2010), Longstaff et al. (2011), Dieckmann and Plank (2012) break down sovereign 
risk into systemic and country-specific components. Altman and Rijken (2011) develop a fundamental-based 
vulnerability indicator that predicts sovereign distress. 
2
 Durbin and Ng (2005) and Peter and Grandes (2005) find that sovereign risk is a significant component of 
corporate bond yields; Arteta and Hale (2008) show that sovereign debt restructurings worsen the private sector 
access to capital markets; Dittmar and Yuan (2008) document that information flows from sovereign to corporate 
bonds. 
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and hold large amounts of government bonds in their portfolios.
3
 The credit risk spillover to the non-
financial sector in developed markets remains, instead, fairly unexplored, as most studies look at joint 
samples of advanced and emerging economies. Borensztein, Cowan and Valenzuela (2013) document that 
sovereign ratings significantly affect corporate ratings, especially in countries with capital restrictions and 
high political risk. Almeida et al. (2013) show that, following a sovereign downgrade, firms at the 
sovereign rating bound reduce investment and leverage more than other firms. Lee, Naranjo and Sirmans 
(2013) explore the role of country-level property rights institutions and disclosure requirements in 
explaining sovereign ceiling violations. Similarly, Bai and Wei (2012) and, in a later paper, Augustin et al. 
(2014) find that strong country-level property rights institutions weaken the connection between sovereign 
and corporate credit risk.  
Our goal is to quantify transfer risk in a sample of developed economies and identify what firm 
attributes render companies vulnerable or resilient to sovereign risk transmission. Our analysis hence 
differs from the previous literature under several aspects. First, we concentrate on the credit risk 
transmission to non-financial firms in Eurozone countries, and, hence, our inferences are not confounded 
by the inclusion of financial institutions and/or emerging markets. Second, we propose and test firm-
specific credit risk transmission channels: We believe these to be more relevant than country-level 
channels given that the countries in our sample enjoy very similar characteristics in terms of property 
rights, creditor rights and disclosure requirements.   
To assess the sovereign-to-corporate spillover, we exploit the European sovereign debt crisis. This led 
to a sizable increase in sovereign risk for many countries thereby questioning the plausibility of the 
common belief that government debt in developed economies is risk free. It is precisely under these 
circumstances that we are interested in quantifying transfer risk and identifying the mechanisms through 
                                                          
3
 Adelino and Ferreira (2014) find that sovereign downgrades adversely affect bank lending by reducing loan 
amounts and increasing loan spreads. Using CDS data on European banks, Ejsing and Lemke (2011) and Acharya, 
Drechsler, and Schnabl (2014) document a significant credit risk transfer from the banking sector to the government 
during bailouts, and in the opposite direction in the post-bailout period. 
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which it operates. We measure credit risk by using credit default swap (CDS) data on 118 non-financial 
companies headquartered in eight Eurozone countries (Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) between January 2008 and December 2011.  
Our main findings on the sovereign-to-corporate spillover are as follows. First, we show that an increase 
in sovereign spreads leads to a significant increase in credit spreads (and, hence, borrowing costs) of non-
financial firms. Our estimates indicate that a 10% increase in sovereign spreads translates into a 0.5%–
0.8% increase in corporate spreads. Second, we take advantage of the cross-sectional variation in firm 
characteristics to shed light on the mechanisms through which transfer risk operates. We find evidence 
that the sovereign-to-corporate spillover is stronger for firms that are more likely to benefit from 
government aid, those whose sales are concentrated in the domestic market, and those that rely on bank 
financing. Our estimates indicate that a 10% increase in sovereign spreads leads to a 0.7%–1.2% increase 
in corporate spreads for those firms. In order to interpret our results in terms of causation instead of pure 
association, throughout the analysis we use a dynamic panel specification as well as an instrumental 
variable approach to limit endogeneity concerns.  
Our findings are innovative and not trivial: Evidence of cross-sectional differences in the sovereign-to-
corporate spillover may have been somehow unexpected in our sample of CDS reference entities. CDSs 
can only be traded on the debt of companies that issue rated, publicly traded bonds, which act as reference 
assets in the CDS contract. These companies are typically more internationally oriented, less financially 
constrained, and less dependent on bank lending than other firms.
4
 As a result, we believe that our findings 
may, in fact, underestimate the impact of an increase in sovereign risk on corporate borrowing costs for 
the average firm. Indeed, using survey data on access to finance of SMEs in the euro area, Holton, 
Lawless and McCann (2014) show that the sovereign crisis spilled over into the real economy through 
tighter credit conditions: SMEs witnessed an increase in loan rejections and interest rates. 
                                                          
4
 Ashcraft and Santos (2009) find that the introduction of CDSs leads to an improvement in borrowing terms for safe 
and transparent firms. Oehmke and Zawadowski (2013) report that large firms with more debt outstanding (mainly in 
the form of bonds) are more likely to become reference entities in the CDS market. 
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the steps we undertake to construct the data set. 
Section 3 provides preliminary evidence of the causal impact of sovereign credit quality on corporate CDS 
spreads. Section 4 investigates the common factors driving sovereign and corporate CDS spreads. Section 
5 presents the empirical findings on the credit risk spillover from the sovereign to the corporate segment. 
Section 6 investigates the transmission mechanisms, while Section 7 provides additional results. Section 8 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Sample construction and summary statistics 
We use CDS spreads as a market measure of credit risk. A CDS contract essentially represents an 
insurance against the risk that an entity (sovereign or firm) defaults on its debt. The key advantage to 
using CDS spreads instead of bond spreads is that they provide a more accurate measure of the issuer’s 
creditworthiness (Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005), Pan and Singleton (2008), Longstaff et al. (2011)), 
given that bond spreads are driven by a multitude of other factors, among which liquidity premia play a 
prominent role. While illiquidity is unlikely to be of concern for sovereign bonds, which are actively 
traded on the secondary market, it is a significant component of non-financial corporate bond spreads. 
Both the sovereign and corporate segments of the CDS market enjoy, instead, comparable liquidity. 
We obtain CDS spreads on sovereign and non-financial entities from the MarkIt Group, a standard 
provider of CDS data, largely employed by academics and practitioners.
5
 To ensure liquidity, we consider 
only the five-year maturity, which is the reference expiry in the corporate CDS segment. We select CDS 
quotes for senior unsecured debt with the modified-modified restructuring clause for firms and the 
cumulative restructuring clause for sovereigns, which represent the conventional (and, hence, most liquid) 
terms for CDS contracts on European reference entities. We consider euro-denominated CDS contracts, 
                                                          
5
 MarkIt provides composite prices based on quotes contributed by more than 30 major market participants on a daily 
basis. The quotes are filtered to remove outliers and stale observations and a daily composite spread is computed 
only if two or more contributors report a valid quote. 
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since the euro is the standard reference currency for most CDSs on European corporate reference entities. 
For consistency, we also use euro-denominated CDSs on sovereigns, even though the most liquid 
contracts in this segment are in U.S. dollars. This is unlikely to introduce a bias, given that the correlation 
between weekly changes in euro CDS spreads and weekly changes in U.S. dollar CDS spreads on the 
sovereign entities in the sample is equal to 94.4%. Our sample only covers members of the euro area that 
adopted the euro by 2001, given the scarcity of firms located in the new Member States (Cyprus, Estonia, 
Malta, Slovakia, and Slovenia) with CDSs traded on their debt. Focusing on (companies located in) the 
euro area makes it easier to control for common shocks that affect corporate and sovereign risk in our 
sample. We do not consider Luxembourg because its sovereign CDS is not available from MarkIt. Finally, 
we exclude the Eurozone subsidiaries of companies headquartered elsewhere. At this stage we have CDS 
data on 240 companies and 11 sovereigns. 
Our data set includes daily CDS premia (in bps) between January 2008 and December 2011. To reduce 
the measurement error that may contaminate daily spreads we carry out our analyses at the weekly level, 
and derive weekly CDS spreads as simple averages of the daily spreads in the week. We limit the sample 
to firms that have publicly traded equity in order to compute a set of market-based control variables at the 
firm-level (as detailed in Section 5).  
To avoid bias due to missing or stale data, we apply a number of filters in line with the existing 
literature (Berndt and Obreja (2010), Schneider, Sögner, and Veza (2010)). First, we exclude CDS series 
where 1) the percentage of missing spreads exceeds 15% of the overall period –that is, more than 31 
missing weekly spreads– and 2) the length of the longest series of consecutive missing spreads is more 
than two weeks. Second, we exclude stale observations with zero changes in corporate or sovereign CDS 
premia. Finally, we require valid data on a minimum of four companies per country and thus remove 
countries with infrequent CDS transactions. Following such restrictions, Austria, Greece, and Ireland are 
excluded because they do not have a sufficient number of companies that meet our data quality thresholds. 
The final sample includes 118 companies headquartered in eight countries. 
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Table 1–Panel A reports the sample breakdown by country. France and Germany are the most 
represented countries, each one comprising about 25%-30% of the sample, in line with the composition of 
widely traded CDS indexes, such as the iTraxx Europe index for non-financial firms. According to the 
summary statistics of sovereign CDS spreads, countries can be split into two groups. The first is formed 
by countries characterized by a relatively low level of credit risk (Finland, France, Germany, and the 
Netherlands): Sovereign CDS spreads are, on average, about 50 bps or less and fairly stable. The countries 
in the second group (Belgium, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) are riskier, as confirmed by average sovereign 
CDS spreads close to 100 bps or higher and a much larger variation than that observed in countries of the 
first group. Corporate CDSs reflect medium credit quality, with median values (computed at country-
level) of firm ratings ranging from BBB for Finland and Portugal to A- for Belgium, the Netherlands, and 
Spain. A number of reference entities (21 out of 118) are assigned a sub-investment grade rating at some 
point during the sample period. These firms are unevenly distributed across countries, as they represent 
10% of the corporate sample in Spain, 18% in Italy, 21% in France, 23% in Germany, and 38% in 
Finland.  
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Figure 1 depicts the evolution of sovereign (solid line) and corporate (dashed line) CDS spreads. The 
graphs suggest two important considerations. First, sovereign credit risk is sizable over the sample period 
in all countries. Sovereign CDS spreads are essentially nil for the first three quarters of 2008 and ramp up 
after September 2008 as a result of the financial crisis and the bank bailout measures adopted by most 
governments. After a tightening in the second half of 2009, sovereign spreads steadily increase again in 
countries facing fiscal strains following the Greek crisis. Sovereign CDS spreads also rise in fiscally 
virtuous economies during the second half of 2011. Second, sovereign and corporate credit risk tend to co-
move.  
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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This evidence is also corroborated by Figure 2, where we plot the rolling correlation –computed over 
52 weeks– between median changes in log weekly corporate CDS spreads and changes in log weekly 
sovereign CDSs, together with 90% confidence intervals. The plots document a fairly high correlation 
with average values ranging from 36% in Belgium to 64% in Italy over the sample period. 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
3. Sovereign-to-corporate spillover: Preliminary evidence from shocks to sovereign risk 
In order to gain preliminary insights on the causal impact of sovereign risk on corporate credit quality, 
we investigate the response of corporate spreads to two shocks to sovereign creditworthiness: Sovereign 
rating changes and the ECB Securities Markets Programme (SMP).  
First, we analyze the reaction of both sovereign and corporate CDS spreads to sovereign rating 
changes. We retrieve from Bloomberg issuers’ rating announcements (upgrades and downgrades) from 
Standard & Poor’s, Fitch and Moody’s. When a sovereign experiences multiple rating changes within a 
15-day period, we retain the earliest rating action only –which typically is more informative. Within our 
sample period, four countries (Belgium, Italy, Portugal and Spain) account for 19 downgrades in total. We 
follow an event study methodology and compute log weekly CDS spreads as log averages of daily CDS 
spreads before (day -5 to day -1) and after (day +1 to day +5) the rating change (day 0) for the four 
sovereigns and the companies headquartered in those countries.
6
 Our variable of interest is the abnormal 
CDS change, which we measure as the difference between log weekly changes in CDS spreads and log 
weekly changes in a benchmark index around the event. We use the iTraxx Europe index as the 
benchmark for corporate entities and, for each country j, the average sovereign CDS spread of all 
Eurozone countries excluding country j. Table 2-Columns (1-2) report the cross-sectional average of 
                                                          
6
 To avoid contamination, we exclude firms that experience a corporate rating change within a 15-day period from 
the sovereign downgrade. This filter removes one company, FIAT S.p.A, which was downgraded by Moody’s on 
September 21, 2011 –two days after the downgrade of Italy.  
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abnormal CDS changes: Following a sovereign downgrade, CDS spreads increase not only for sovereign 
entities, but also for the non-financial companies headquartered in the downgraded countries.  
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
This evidence suggests that the direction of causality is likely to go from the sovereign to the corporate 
sector. Should the spillover go in the opposite direction, we would expect to find that corporate rating 
changes affect sovereign credit spreads. Hence, we replicate the event study around corporate rating 
changes. We exclude corporate rating actions when a change in the sovereign rating takes place within a 
15-day period. This leaves us with a sample of 188 downgrades and 70 upgrades for 87 unique firms. 
Table 3 reports the cross-sectional average of abnormal CDS changes, separately for upgrades and 
downgrades. We find that corporate rating changes significantly affect corporate credit spreads with the 
expected sign: Downgrades (upgrades) produce a widening (tightening) of corporate CDS spreads. 
Importantly, sovereign spreads are instead unaffected. We interpret these findings as evidence against 
credit risk transmission from the corporate to the sovereign segment. 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
We then focus on the ECB SMP as another example of a shock to sovereign credit quality. By means 
of the SMP, the ECB purchased government debt securities of selected countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal, and Spain) to address tensions in financial markets. The largest purchases followed the 
introduction of the SMP on May 10, 2010 and its reactivation on August 8, 2011 (see Barclays Capital 
(2012)). Eser and Schwaab (2015) document a statistically significant and economically large reduction in 
yield spreads of the countries involved in the large scale asset purchase programme, thereby suggesting 
that the SMP was unanticipated. We replicate the event study for Italy, Portugal and Spain and the 
companies located in these countries around the two SMP announcement dates and report results in Table 
2-Columns (3-4). We observe a decrease in sovereign risk, in line with the evidence provided by Eser and 
Schwaab (2015), and further find that corporate CDS spreads decrease as well.  
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We take these event studies as preliminary evidence of a credit risk transfer from the sovereign to the 
non-financial sector (but not viceversa). In what follows we quantify the sovereign-to-corporate spillover 
making use of our entire sample within a more general framework.  
 
4. Commonalities in sovereign and corporate credit spreads 
We explore whether changes in sovereign and corporate credit risk are driven by common factors to gain 
insights on the choice of control variables for our empirical model.  
We first look at the correlation matrices of weekly changes in sovereign and corporate CDS spreads, 
respectively. In line with Longstaff et al. (2011), we find large co-movements in sovereign spreads, with 
an average pairwise correlation of about 63% over the sample period. Instead, the corresponding average 
pairwise correlation in weekly spread changes of the non-financial firms in the sample is only about 43%. 
These numbers suggest that sovereign CDS spreads are more influenced by global factors than corporate 
CDS spreads, where other variables (country- and firm-specific) play a more prominent role.  
To better understand the sources of commonality in sovereign and corporate spreads, we conduct a 
principal component analysis (PCA) of the changes in sovereign CDS spreads and compare the results 
with those for the PCA of the changes in corporate CDS spreads. The PCAs are performed on the 
correlation matrices of weekly spread changes. The results are presented in Table 4. The first principal 
component (PC) explains 69% of sample variation in sovereign spreads, whereas the first five components 
explain 95%. This is in line with findings from previous studies (Longstaff et al. (2011), Dieckmann and 
Plank (2012)) that indicate a large degree of commonality in the dynamics of sovereign CDS spreads in 
the euro area. When looking at the PCA on corporate spread changes, we observe instead a much lower 
degree of commonality. The first PC explains about 47% of sample variation, and the first five 
components explain a little more than 60%. The correlation between the time series of the first PC 
11 
 
extracted from sovereign and corporate CDS changes is 52%, which suggest that the main source of 
variation across both sovereign and corporate spreads is related to global Eurozone factors. 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
Figure 3 plots the loadings of the first PC for sovereigns (left panel), as well as the histogram of the 
loadings of the first PC for corporate reference entities (right panel). The weighting of the common 
component is essentially the same (about 0.35) for all sovereigns except Portugal, which suffered repeated 
credit downgrades over the period under investigation. The factor loadings of the first component are 
instead much smaller and more heterogeneous for non-financial firms: The histogram shows a relevant 
dispersion around the median weighting of 0.10.  
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
The PCA reveals that variables common to the euro area seem to have a strong and uniform impact on 
the dynamics of sovereign credit spreads, while their effect on corporate spread changes is much more 
limited and mixed. Therefore other variables (country- and firm-specific) should be accounted for when 
attempting to explain such changes.    
 
5. Relation between sovereign and corporate credit spreads 
To formally investigate the effect of variations in sovereign risk on corporate credit risk we regress 
changes in log weekly corporate CDS spreads on changes in log weekly sovereign CDS spreads. 
Following Acharya, Drechsler and Schnabl (2014), we use log CDS spreads –instead of CDS spreads– to 
reduce the effect of outliers and enhance comparability across sovereigns, firms and time periods with 
dissimilar CDS levels. We use log changes in CDS spreads –instead of log CDS spreads– because we are 
interested in the impact of variations in sovereign credit risk on corporate credit risk.
7
  
                                                          
7
 Additionally, CDS spreads are non-stationary, over the period under investigation, for most firms in the sample. 
According to unreported Dickey-Fuller tests with time trend and intercept, the null hypothesis of unit root in log 
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The commonalities in the dynamics of corporate and sovereign CDS spreads, documented in Figures 1 
and 2 and by the PCA, suggest that global factors account for an important share of the variation in credit 
risk within the Eurozone. We include time (week) fixed effects to capture these market-wide changes in 
macroeconomic fundamentals that directly affect both corporate and sovereign credit risk. We opt for time 
fixed effects, in lieu of a set of indicators of macroeconomic fundamentals (e.g. Eurozone stock market 
index returns and volatility, treasury yield term structure), to better control for omitted variables. As 
discussed in Section 4, both country- and firm-specific factors are likely to play a significant role in 
explaining changes in corporate CDS spreads and, as such, should be added to our control variables. The 
inclusion of country-level factors contributes to further mitigate omitted variable concerns, since it enables 
us to isolate the impact of changes in sovereign creditworthiness over and above those country-level 
shocks that affect both sovereign and corporate CDS spreads.  
To keep the model parsimonious, we retain a limited number of country- and firm-level explanatory 
variables suggested by the existing literature on the determinants of corporate credit spreads (Collin-
Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001), and Campbell and Taksler (2003)) and sovereign credit spreads 
(Longstaff et al. (2011), and Dieckmann and Plank (2012)). Table A1 in the Appendix details the 
construction of these variables and Table 1–Panel B shows descriptive statistics.   
Local/country variables. The state of the local economy is an important determinant of sovereign and 
corporate credit quality alike: An improvement in a country’s business climate is expected to positively 
affect firms’ creditworthiness. We proxy the state of a country’s economy with two variables: Local 
excess returns, i.e. the difference between log returns on the domestic Dow Jones Total Market index and 
log returns on the EuroStoxx 50 index, and local excess volatility, measured by weekly changes in the 
standard deviation of local excess returns.  
                                                                                                                                                                                            
CDS levels is rejected only for 13 firms out of 118 at the 5% significance level, while log changes in CDS spreads 
are always stationary. 
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Idiosyncratic/firm variables. Firm-specific equity returns and risk affect a firm’s probability of default 
over and above what can be ascribed to more general movements in equity market returns and volatility. 
In particular, corporate CDS spreads should be negatively (positively) correlated with idiosyncratic equity 
returns (volatility). We use firm excess returns, relative to the domestic Dow Jones Total Market index, as 
a measure of idiosyncratic equity returns,
8
 and proxy variations in idiosyncratic volatility with changes in 
the standard deviation of firm excess returns.  
Given the choice of control variables, we estimate the following pooled OLS regression: 
log(CCDSijt)=i+log(SCDSjt)+Xijt+t+ijt      (1) 
where log(CCDSijt) is the change in the log CDS spread (in bps) of firm i headquartered in country j 
from week t–1 to week t, log(SCDSjt) is the change in the log CDS spread (in bps) of country j from 
week t–1 to week t, Xijt are the changes from week t–1 to week t in the local and idiosyncratic variables, 
and i and t are firm and time (week) fixed effects. Although specification (1) includes a number of 
aggregate and firm-specific factors, the regression residuals may still be correlated across firms, countries, 
and weeks. We then follow Petersen (2009) and Thompson (2011) and compute two-way clustered 
standard errors by country and time (week). We choose to cluster at the country, instead of firm, level to 
control for within-country residual correlation.  
Column 1 of Table 5 presents regression results. The estimate for  indicates that a 10% increase in 
sovereign credit spreads is associated with a 0.5% increase in corporate credit spreads. The economic 
magnitude of this correlation may seem limited. However, we argue that the effect is still substantial, as it 
corresponds to about one third of the estimated impact of an increase in sovereign CDS spreads on the 
credit risk of financial institutions in the aftermath of the 2008 bailouts (see Table 8 in Acharya, 
Drechsler, and Schnabl (2014)), and banks are more directly and heavily exposed to sovereign risk than 
non-financial firms through their holdings of sovereign bonds.  
                                                          
8
 Equity returns have also been used in studies of yield changes to proxy for changes in (market) leverage, given that 
variations in book leverage are only available at very low frequency.  
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INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
Specification (1) may suffer from reverse causality when corporate credit risk feeds back into 
sovereign risk. We address endogeneity concerns in two ways.  
First, we enrich model (1) by adding the lagged value of the dependent variable, log(CCDSijt-1), to our 
regressors. Dynamic panel models are widely used in finance to control for endogeneity arising from the 
dynamic nature of the relation between dependent and independent variables (see, among others, Wintoki, 
Linck and Netter (2012)). In this respect, using a dynamic panel helps us control for the possibility that 
current changes in sovereign CDS spreads may depend on past changes in corporate CDS spreads. It is 
well known that when the number of cross-sectional units in the dynamic panel is very large compared to 
its time dimension, the least-squares estimates are biased (Nickell (1981), Flannery and Watson-Hankins 
(2013)) and alternative techniques, such as GMM, are to be preferred. The dimension of our panel (118 
firms by 208 weeks) makes this bias negligible and we estimate the dynamic model using the standard 
least-squares dependent variable (LSDV) approach. Regression results are reported in Table 5-Column 2. 
Past changes in corporate CDS spreads are indeed a significant determinant of current spread changes.
9
 
However, we document a significant spillover from sovereign to corporate credit risk and, in fact, the 
estimate for  is larger than the one obtained with pooled OLS.   
Second, we estimate specification (1) by means of instrumental variables (IV). We instrument 
log(SCDSjt) with )SCDSΔlog( j t , i.e. log changes in the average sovereign CDS spreads of all Eurozone 
countries excluding country j.  
We argue that our instrument is strong because variations in sovereign credit risk are highly correlated 
across Eurozone countries during the sample period. The first-stage F test for significance of the 
instrument equals 11.382: It is above the “rule of thumb” threshold of 10, which confirms that the 
instrument is not weak. For the instrument to be valid, we need variations in the credit quality of other 
                                                          
9
 In unreported (but available upon request) analyses we test that one lag is sufficient to capture all information from 
the past.  
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Eurozone countries to be uncorrelated with changes in the credit risk of domestic firms after taking into 
account domestic sovereign risk and other control variables. This may not be the case for firms whose 
features render them particularly sensitive to other Eurozone countries’ sovereign risk –for instance 
companies that predominantly export to these markets. To investigate time variation in such 
characteristics, we measure a firm’s exposure to other Eurozone countries as one minus the fraction (out 
of total sales) of domestic sales plus sales in non-EU countries. Figure 4 depicts the cross-sectional 
distribution of firm-average Eurozone sales together with the maximum and minimum of firm-level yearly 
values. The cross-sectional mean (median) value of the firm-level difference between the maximum and 
minimum firm’s exposure to other Eurozone markets over the years is 8.3% (3.8%). This indicates that, at 
the firm level, sales to other Eurozone countries are fairly stable across time: Firm fixed effects therefore 
take care of cross-sectional differences in foreign exposures.  
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
Column 3 of Table 5 reports the estimates from the second-stage IV regression, and shows that 
(instrumented) changes in sovereign credit risk positively and significantly affect changes in corporate 
CDS spreads. The coefficient on instrumented log(SCDSjt) is nearly twice as large as the one estimated 
with pooled OLS: This, together with the dynamic panel estimate for  suggests that, if anything, 
correcting for endogeneity unveils an even stronger positive relation between sovereign and corporate 
credit risk.  
 
6. Channels of transmission 
We now focus on firm-specific mechanisms that affect the response of corporate credit spreads to 
variations in sovereign credit spreads. The empirical methodology we follow is common to all 
mechanisms and we detail it here. We consider three distinct channels: Government guarantees, sales 
concentration in the domestic market, and reliance on bank financing. For each channel we create an 
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indicator variable (Di) that takes a value of one if the firm benefits from government guarantees, places its 
output predominantly on the domestic market, or relies heavily on bank debt. We then enrich specification 
(1) with the interaction terms between Di and our main variable of interest, log(SCDSjt), as well as 
between Di and the controls, Xijt and t:
10
  
log(CCDSijt)=i+log(SCDSjt)+Dilog(SCDSjt)+Xijt+DiXijt+t+tDi+ijt  (2)  
In specification (2),  encapsulates the extra-sensitivity to changes in sovereign credit quality for firms 
with government guarantees, sales concentration in the domestic market, or reliance on bank financing. In 
line with the analysis in Section 5, we estimate specification (2) with pooled OLS, dynamic panel, and IV. 
Again, the main goal of the dynamic panel and the IV is to ensure that our results can be interpreted in 
terms of causation rather than simple association.  
When estimating model (2) with IV, we have two endogenous regressors, log(SCDSjt) and 
Dilog(SCDSjt), which we instrument with )SCDS(Δlog j t  and )SCDSΔlog(D j ti  , respectively. 
Instrument strength cannot be assessed using the first-stage F test because we have more than one 
endogenous regressor. We therefore provide two first-stage diagnostic tools: The Kleinbergen-Paap LM 
statistic for underidentification and the Kleinbergen-Paap Wald statistic for weak identification.
11
 We 
anticipate that, for all channels, we can reject the null hypothesis of weak instruments at standard 
significance levels.  
 
                                                          
10
 The indicator variable, Di, is a time-invariant firm characteristic, hence the main effect of Di is already captured by 
the firm fixed effect, i. 
11
 Given that our model is just-identified, we work with t-test size for weak identification. The usual approach in the 
applied literature is to conclude that instruments are not weak if the K-P Wald statistic is above the Stock and Yogo 
(2005) critical values. Based on these critical values we report the p-values for the t-test size at 10% and at 25% 
following the approach in Bazzi and Clemens (2013).  
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6.1 Government aid 
Government-controlled firms enjoy both deep credit lines and debt guarantees from the state. Faccio, 
Masulis, and McConnell (2006) study 450 firms from 35 countries and document that politically 
connected firms are more likely to be bailed out than similar unconnected firms. Borisova and Megginson 
(2011) find that, as a result of privatization, a 1% decrease in government ownership is associated with a 
0.75 bps increase in a firm’s credit spread. However, when concerns about the solvency of the government 
arise, government guarantees quickly lose value, thus eroding the creditworthiness of government-
controlled companies. In addition, these firms are usually more likely to be the target of ad hoc measures 
should the government need to raise funds in the face of budget concerns. As a result, we expect firms 
under governmental influence to be relatively more affected by changes in sovereign credit risk. 
An obvious candidate for the identification of government-controlled firms would be the proportion of 
equity owned by the government, either directly or indirectly. However, this measure does not provide a 
realistic representation of the influence exercised by the government on a firm: By examining a sample of 
firms that underwent privatization, Bortolotti and Faccio (2009) document that governments tend to retain 
substantial power in formerly state-owned enterprises in a number of ways.
12
 Privatizations of state-owned 
firms often witness the sale of equity without a proportional transfer of control. Consequently, government 
ownership underestimates the actual involvement of governments in firms. We therefore resort to the 
FEEM–KPMG Privatization Barometer (PB)
13
 database to identify firms that have been entirely or 
partially privatized by the state and which may still be de facto under the government’s influence through 
one of the mechanisms discussed above. We create the indicator variable Govti, which, for firm i, equals 
                                                          
12
 For instance, a government can adopt ownership-leveraging devices (pyramiding and dual-class shares) and 
remain the largest ultimate shareholder of a firm even without owning a majority of its equity. Alternatively, 
governments can hold golden shares, which enable them to outvote all other shareholders and significantly affect 
corporate decisions. Over the past decade, the European Court of Justice has in several instances declared the holding 
of golden shares by France, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Portugal and Spain illegal.  
13
 The PB is a monthly updated database containing privatization transactions for 25 European countries from 1977 
to the present. The database provides information on the percentage of direct retained government ownership and the 
dates of privatization transactions and was used by, among others, Borisova and Megginson (2011). 
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one if the firm is listed in the PB in any year between 1977 and 2011, and zero otherwise.
14
 We then use 
national stock exchanges’ and regulatory bodies’ websites (see the data appendix in Bortolotti and Faccio 
(2009) for a list of data sources) to augment the indicator Govti for those cases where a firm is state 
controlled but has never been privatized (and, hence, is not included in the PB database). One firm out of 
three is under governmental influence (Table 1-Panel C).  
To empirically assess the relevance of the government guarantees channel, we use Govti as the 
indicator variable Di in specification (2). Regression results are reported in Table 6. Consistently with our 
conjecture, we observe a significantly stronger sovereign-to-corporate credit risk transfer for firms under 
government influence with all the different estimation methods: Following an increase in sovereign risk, 
government-controlled firms experience an increase in CDS spreads which is two to three times higher 
than other firms.  
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
As an alternative proxy for the likelihood to receive government aid, we consider a firm’s strategic 
relevance to a country. Strategic firms typically contribute to a large fraction of a country’s economic 
output and employ a significant share of a country’s workforce: As such, they are more likely to benefit 
from government aid in case of financial distress.
15
 If sovereign risk increases, the value of such an 
“option” to access state aid for these strategic companies decreases and their creditworthiness might, in 
turn, be negatively affected. 
To test whether strategic firms are more exposed to sovereign risk than other firms, we measure the 
relevance of a firm with the ratio between the firm’s market capitalization and the total market 
                                                          
14
 Although in principle the value of Govti could change over time for a given firm, none of our firms were privatized 
between 2008 and 2011. Therefore Govti is effectively a firm (rather than firm-year) indicator. 
15
 The European Community Treaty generally prohibits state aid unless it is justified by reasons of general economic 
development. Recent examples of government aid include various measures adopted to support the automotive 
industry in the Eurozone. 
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capitalization of the country (MktCapit), both recorded on the closing date of the annual report.
16
 The 
market capitalization of firms (in million of euros) and the closing dates of the annual reports are obtained 
from the Bureau Van Dijk’s Orbis database and the market capitalization of individual countries (in 
millions of euros) is from Bloomberg. Orbis variables are available at annual frequency and we match 
CDS quotes in a given year t with MktCapit-1, i.e. relative market capitalization at year-end t–1. We 
compute, for each firm, MktCapi as the average value of MktCapit over the sample period. The cross-
sectional distribution of MktCapi is depicted in Figure 5.  
INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE 
Relative market capitalization is, on average, about 3% (Table 1-Panel C) with values ranging from 
0.1% (Dyckerhoff) to 30% (Nokia). We then sort firms into those with “Low strategic relevance” 
(HMktCapi=0) and “High strategic relevance” (HMktCapi=1) depending on whether MktCapi is below or 
above the sample median.
17
 We use HMktCapi as the indicator variable in specification (2) and estimate it 
with pooled OLS, dynamic panel and IV. The findings, reported in Table 7, confirm that the credit risk of 
strategic firms is significantly more affected by changes in sovereign credit quality. To sum up, the joint 
evidence from Tables 6 and 7 documents that the sovereign-to-corporate spillover is indeed more relevant 
for companies that may enjoy government aid. 
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
 
                                                          
16
 Alternative measures of strategic importance may be based on firm assets or the number of employees. However, 
such measures could overestimate a firm’s contribution to the domestic economy when it operates internationally. 
Given that the proportions of domestic assets and of the workforce employed domestically are rarely available from 
the consolidated financial statements, we opt for market capitalization as a proxy for a firm’s strategic relevance.  
17
 We are interested in studying the role of several firm attributes (government aid, sales concentration in the 
domestic market, and reliance on bank debt) in mitigating or worsening the impact of sovereign risk on corporate 
credit risk. Inferences may be confounded if variation in these firm attributes is endogenous to unobserved variation 
in corporate CDS changes. Our results are essentially unchanged if we use firm characteristics measured at the 
beginning of our sample period, i.e. December 2007.  
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6.2 Domestic demand 
Following an increase in sovereign risk, governments may decide to adopt restrictive monetary or 
fiscal measures aimed at restoring creditworthiness, which can lead to a significant contraction in 
domestic demand. This, in turn, can increase default risk for those firms whose business relies heavily on 
the domestic market: Non-exporting firms are more likely to experience a decline in profits and net worth 
and, thus, to face tighter borrowing constraints (Arteta and Hale (2008)). Consistently with this channel, 
Borensztein, Cowan, and Valenzuela (2013) document a larger impact of sovereign credit ratings on 
corporate credit ratings for firms in the non-tradable sector relative to those in the tradable sector. 
We retrieve information from Orbis on geographic segmentation of sales and use the proportion of 
domestic sales (Salesit), computed as the ratio of sales in the country where the company is headquartered 
to total sales, as a measure of exposure to the domestic market. Similarly to what we have done for the 
government aid channel,
18
 we split the sample of firms into two groups –“Low domestic sales” 
(HSalesi=0) and “High domestic sales” (HSalesi=1)–, based on whether Salesi, i.e. the firm-average value 
of Salesit, is below or above the median value in the cross-section. As Figure 5 reveals, domestic market 
concentration shows substantial cross-sectional variation: About 10% of our sample firms place less than 
10% of their output in the domestic market, while another 10% –mostly companies operating in the 
utilities and infrastructure sector– cater exclusively to home-country customers. We then replace Di with 
HSalesi in model (2) to assess the incremental effect of variations in sovereign risk on firms that rely more 
heavily on domestic demand. The findings, presented in Table 8, indicate that, in fact, it is only the firms 
whose sales are more concentrated in the domestic market that are significantly affected by changes in the 
sovereign creditworthiness. This confirms the relevance of the domestic demand channel.  
INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
                                                          
18
 There may be concerns that firms previously classified as government influenced also predominantly cater to the 
domestic market (e.g., utilities). The firm-level correlation coefficient between Salesi and Govti is 0.282 and that 
between Salesi and MktCapi is 0.004, suggesting that this is not the case. 
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6.3 Credit squeeze 
Recent theoretical models (e.g., Gennaioli, Martin, and Rossi (2014)) argue that sovereign defaults lead 
to severe disruption in domestic credit markets. Such theoretical arguments find support in the empirical 
literature. Evidence by Borensztein and Panizza (2008) confirms that, indeed, sovereign defaults are 
frequently accompanied by domestic banking crises that further depress investment and output. In the 
context of the pre and post 2007–2009 crisis, Ejsing and Lemke (2011) and Acharya, Drechsler, and 
Schnabl (2014) document a significant increase in bank CDS spreads following an increase in sovereign 
CDS spreads. The transmission of sovereign to corporate credit risk (for financial and non-financial firms) 
goes as follows. First, the government provides a series of implicit and explicit guarantees to the financial 
system that become at risk as the sovereign creditworthiness deteriorates. Second, banks typically hold 
large amounts of government bonds in their portfolios that lose value as sovereign credit risk widens. As a 
result, banks’ funding costs sharpen and fears of bank runs heighten. Third, the deleveraging of banks’ 
balance sheets has an immediate impact on non-financial firms in terms of reduced bank lending. Recent 
evidence by Acharya et al. (2014), Becker and Ivashina (2014), Popov and van Horen (2014) suggests that 
after the start of the Eurozone debt crisis, increased government bond holdings generated a crowding out 
of corporate lending. Hence, we expect the cost of funding for companies that rely more heavily on bank 
financing to be more severely affected by an increase in sovereign spreads. 
We retrieve from Orbis the proportion of bank debt (Bankit), computed as the ratio of bank loans to 
total debt (i.e., the sum of long-term debt plus long-term debt in current liabilities), which is our proxy for 
the firm’s exposure to the banking sector.   
To test the relevance of the credit squeeze channel, we replicate the methodological steps outlined in 
Sections 6.1 and 6.2 for the other transmission channels. We use HBanki in lieu of Di where HBanki=0 if 
Banki, the firm-average value of Bankit, falls below the cross-sectional median value of Banki, and 
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HBanki=1 otherwise. Bank financing represents about 40% of total debt, on average, for our sample firms 
(Table 1–Panel C) with substantial cross-sectional variation (Figure 5). Results for the three estimation 
methods are reported in Table 9. We observe that changes in sovereign creditworthiness mainly affect 
bank-dependent firms, thus confirming a spillover from sovereign to corporate risk through the financial 
intermediation channel. 
INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE 
A potential concern with this finding is that we may be erroneously ascribing the effect to bank 
deleveraging while, in fact, it may be operating via debt rollover risk. To illustrate this point, suppose a 
firm’s financing needs can be met by (possibly a mix of) bank and other (e.g., bond) financing and that 
bank financing is short term while bond financing is long term. Under these circumstances, funding 
sources are directly related to corporate debt maturity: Firms borrowing predominantly from banks are 
also characterized by shorter maturity debt and face higher refinancing risk than those tapping the bond 
market. If this were the case, the greater sensitivity to sovereign risk that we uncover for firms that rely on 
bank financing could be the byproduct of shorter debt maturities.
19
 To test whether firms with shorter debt 
maturities are more exposed to changes in sovereign risk, we use the fraction of current to total debt as a 
proxy for refinancing risk (Currentit) and classify firms as “High refinancing risk” (HCurrenti=1) when 
Currenti, their firm-average value of Currentit, is above the cross-sectional median value. Table 10 reports 
regression results for specification (2) using HCurrenti as the firm indicator Di. Changes in corporate 
CDSs are significantly and positively associated with changes in sovereign CDSs, but firms with shorter 
debt maturities are not more sensitive to variations in sovereign risk –indeed we find some evidence that 
these firms are less sensitive. We conclude that bank debt rather than, more generally, short-term debt, 
significantly affects the spillover from sovereign to corporate credit risk. 
INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE 
                                                          
19
 Almeida et al. (2012) find that firms whose long-term debt was largely maturing right after the onset of the August 
2007 credit crisis cut their investment more than otherwise similar firms whose debt was scheduled to mature after 
2008. 
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7. Additional results 
In this section we provide a number of additional results for the sovereign-to-corporate spillover. First, 
we show that the link between sovereign and corporate credit risk is not confined to the most represented 
countries in our sample, France and Germany, but rather truly general to the Eurozone. Second, we 
investigate the transmission channels using different sorts for our sample firms. For the sake of 
conciseness, we report estimates from the IV specification only.  
 
7.1 Country representativeness  
One potential issue with the above results is that the estimate of the spillover effects may be driven by 
firms headquartered in France and Germany, which jointly account for about 60% of the observations. To 
assess this potential bias, we first create the indicator variable Smalli which equals one for firms located in 
Belgium, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal or Spain. We then augment specification (1) with the 
interaction between Smalli and log(SCDSjt). The coefficient on log(SCDSjt) measures the spillover in 
France and Germany, while the sum of this term and the coefficient on )Δlog(SCDSSmall j ti   captures 
the effect in all other countries. Table 11-Column 1 reports IV second-stage regression results for this 
specification. We estimate a significant spillover of 0.051 in France and Germany. In other countries, the 
spillover is nearly double and significant.  
INSERT TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE 
Turning to the transmission channels, we include in specification (2) the interaction between Smalli 
and log(SCDSjt) as well as the triple interaction among Smalli, log(SCDSjt) and Di: 
log(CCDSijt)=log(SCDSjt)  
+Dilog(SCDSjt)+Smallilog(SCDSjt)+SmalliDilog(SCDSjt)+Controls+ijt     (3) 
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where Controls include all other variables from specification (2). We are interested in + and +++, 
which measure the magnitude of each transmission channel in France and Germany, and in other 
countries, respectively. We report IV estimates in Table 11-columns (2) to (6).
20
 The p-values for the 
Wald test confirm that Govti, HMktCapi, HSalesi, and HBanki significantly affect the strength of the 
sovereign-to-corporate spillover for both France/Germany and smaller countries.   
 
7.2 Alternative sorting 
So far we have used time-invariant indicator variables Di to classify firms according to the 
characteristics we believe may affect the transmission from sovereign to corporate credit risk. This choice 
is valid as long as such firm characteristics remain fairly stable through time. In some instances, however, 
this assumption may be restrictive. During recession times, for example, some firms may attempt to re-
orient themselves away from the domestic economy and/or re-balance their debt structure. If this is the 
case, then it would be more appropriate to sort firms by means of a time-varying indicator. We therefore 
define a binary variable Dit which equals one if, in year t, firm i characteristic (relative market 
capitalization, domestic to total sales, bank loans to total debt, current to total debt) is above the cross-
sectional median in that year, and estimate: 
log(CCDSijt)=i+Dit+log(SCDSjt)+Ditlog(SCDSjt)+Xijt+DitXijt+t+tDit+ijt        (4) 
Second-stage IV regression results are reported in Table 12, and are in line with our previous findings: 
Firms that are more strategically relevant, those with high domestic sales, and those that rely more on 
bank debt are significantly more sensitive to changes in sovereign risk –while firms with more current 
debt are not. 
INSERT TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE 
 
                                                          
20
 Since we have four endogenous variables and four instruments in specification (3), we cannot make use of Stock 
and Yogo (2005) critical values for the weak identification test. We therefore report the K-P LM statistic for 
underidentification only. We reject the null of underidentification at standard significance levels. 
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8. Conclusions 
We explore the effect of changes in the creditworthiness of developed sovereign entities on the credit 
risk of domestic non-financial firms. We measure credit risk with CDS spreads on both sovereigns and 
corporates from January 2008 to December 2011 for eight countries in the Eurozone. We report the 
following findings. First, an increase in sovereign risk translates into a significant increase in corporate 
credit risk, after controlling for a set of global as well as country- and firm-specific variables. Second, the 
spillover effect is significantly higher for firms that enjoy government guarantees, place most of their 
output on the domestic market, or rely heavily on bank financing. 
Our findings suggest that investors’ concerns of a country’s debt problems translate into higher funding 
costs for domestic non-financial corporate issuers. In this respect, strict fiscal discipline has both direct 
and indirect benefits for a country: It not only improves sovereign creditworthiness, but also reduces 
firms’ borrowing costs, which, in turn, can foster economic growth. Additionally, loosening the links that 
exacerbate the sovereign-to-corporate spillover may help stabilize corporate funding costs.  
INSERT TABLE A1 ABOUT HERE 
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Table A1. Control variables  
This table provides a detailed description of the control variables included in the model specifications and their 
source.  
Variable Description Source 
Local 
Local exc retjt Log return in the domestic Dow Jones Total Market 
index in excess of the log return in the EuroStoxx 50 
index 
Bloomberg, Datastream 
 Local voljt Change in the domestic (annualized) volatility, 
computed as rolling standard deviation of the local 
excess stock returns over the past 180 days 
Bloomberg, Datastream 
Idiosyncratic 
Idiosyncratic exc retit Firm’s stock log return in excess of the log return in 
the domestic Dow Jones Total Market index  
Bloomberg, Datastream 
 Idiosyncratic volit Change in the firm’s (annualized) idiosyncratic 
volatility, computed as rolling standard deviation of 
the firm’s excess stock returns over the past 180 days 
Bloomberg, Datastream 
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
This table shows summary statistics of CDS spreads, control variables, and firm-characteristics. Panel A contains 
summary statistics of weekly CDS spreads of reference entities headquartered in Eurozone countries from January 
2008 to December 2011. For each country, the table contains the number of firm-week observations, the number of 
firms, and the mean, median, and standard deviation of corporate as well as sovereign CDS spreads (bps). The last 
column reports the median long-term Standard and Poor’s rating of firms in each country. Panel B reports summary 
statistics, multiplied by 100, of the weekly control variables (local and idiosyncratic) defined in Table A1. Panel C 
contains summary statistics of firm characteristics, computed as firm-level averages of yearly values. Govti equals 
one if the firm is state controlled or it has been entirely or partially privatized. MktCapi is the ratio between the firm’s 
market capitalization and the total market capitalization of the country. Salesi is the fraction of sales in the country 
where the company is headquartered to total sales. Banki is the fraction of bank loans to total debt. Currenti is the 
fraction of current to total debt.   
   
Panel A: CDS 
Country   Corporate CDS Sovereign CDS Corp.  
  Obs. Firms Mean Median Std.dev. Mean Median Std.dev. rating 
Belgium 773 5 115.1 85.0 74.5 94.2 88.8 63.3 A- 
Finland 1,511 8 344.2 152.0 622.8 32.1 27.2 18.6 BBB 
France 7,613 39 190.7 126.0 192.1 54.2 50.8 37.3 BBB+ 
Germany 5,864 31 230.1 121.4 375.1 34.2 32.4 18.1 BBB+ 
Italy 1,774 11 231.4 167.7 214.6 140.4 116.3 100.8 BBB+ 
Netherlands 1,838 10 88.7 77.6 49.2 45.0 38.6 27.8 A- 
Portugal 790 4 243.9 186.0 196.8 306.4 136.6 337.3 BBB 
Spain 1,675 10 190.4 147.0 146.6 138.1 114.4 89.5 A- 
          
Overall 21,838 118 205.8 122.2 296.3 70.5 44.6 98.7  
 
Panel B: Control variables 
Local (N=208 observations) 
  Mean Median Std.dev. 
Local exc retjt    
Belgium 0.121 0.202 1.710 
Finland -0.142 0.067 2.077 
France 0.032 0.075 0.616 
Germany 0.062 0.106 0.946 
Italy -0.166 -0.078 1.205 
Netherlands 0.018 0.037 1.365 
Portugal -0.135 -0.105 1.959 
Spain 0.005 -0.080 1.345 
 Local voljt    
Belgium 0.041 0.025 0.517 
Finland 0.009 -0.002 0.533 
France 0.008 -0.002 0.251 
Germany 0.017 0.007 0.681 
Italy 0.031 0.007 0.464 
Netherlands 0.018 -0.004 0.446 
Portugal 0.032 -0.006 0.470 
Spain 0.009 0.007 0.442 
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(Table 1-Panel B cont.) 
    
Idiosyncratic (N=21,838 observations) 
  Mean Median Std.dev. 
Idiosyncratic exc retit 0.053 0.063 3.482 
Idiosyncratic volit 0.039 0.009 1.099 
 
Panel C: Firm characteristics 
  Firms Mean Median Std.dev. 
Govti 115 0.330 0 0.472 
MktCapi (%) 100 3.368 1.540 4.928 
Salesi (%) 87 45.805 34.384 32.392 
Banki (%) 83 40.101 19.740 37.811 
Currenti (%) 101 9.990 7.865 11.379 
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Table 2. Sovereign rating changes and the ECB SMP programme  
This table reports the effect of sovereign rating downgrades and the ECB Securities Markets Programme (SMP) on 
corporate and sovereign credit spreads. Sovereign rating changes include 19 downgrades affecting Belgium, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain, from Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch. For the SMP we consider the two announcement 
dates of May 10, 2010 (introduction of the asset purchase programme) and August 8, 2011 (reactivation of the asset 
purchase programme). The countries affected by the SMP in our sample are Italy, Portugal and Spain. Abnormal 
corporate CDSs are differences between log weekly corporate CDS changes and log weekly Itraxx changes around 
the rating action. Abnormal sovereign CDSs are differences between log weekly sovereign CDS changes and log 
weekly changes in average sovereign CDS spreads of all other European countries. t-statistics are given in 
parenthesis below average abnormal CDSs. 
***
, 
**
, and 
* 
denote significance of the one-sided test at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Sovereign rating downgrades ECB SMP 
 Abnormal sovereign 
CDSs 
Abnormal corporate 
CDSs 
Abnormal sovereign 
CDSs 
Abnormal corporate 
CDSs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Mean 0.030** 0.038*** -0.100* -0.043*** 
t-stat (-1.894) (4.121) (-1.874) (-2.480) 
Obs. 19 119 6 44 
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Table 3. Corporate rating changes 
This table reports the effect of corporate rating changes on corporate and sovereign credit spreads. Corporate rating 
changes include 188 downgrades and 70 upgrades from Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch. Abnormal corporate 
CDSs are differences between log weekly corporate CDS changes and log weekly Itraxx changes around the rating 
action. Abnormal sovereign CDSs are differences between log weekly sovereign CDS changes and log weekly 
changes in average sovereign CDS spreads of all other European countries around the rating action. t-statistics are 
given in parenthesis below average abnormal CDSs. 
***
, 
**
, and 
* 
denote significance of the one-sided test at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Rating upgrades Rating downgrades 
 Abnormal corporate 
CDSs 
Abnormal sovereign 
CDSs 
Abnormal corporate 
CDSs 
Abnormal sovereign 
CDSs 
Mean -0.028*** -0.001 0.019*** -0.001 
t-stat (-3.999) (-0.025) (2.420) (-0.091) 
Obs. 70 67 188 177 
37 
 
Table 4. Principal component analyses  
This table reports the percentage of variance explained by the first five components extracted from the principal 
component analyses of the correlation matrix of weekly changes in sovereign CDS spreads and the correlation matrix 
of weekly changes in corporate CDS spreads between January 2008 and December 2011. 
 
 Sovereign Corporate 
Principal 
Component 
Sample Variation 
Explained (%) 
Total 
Sample Variation 
Explained (%) 
Total 
First  68.69 68.69 46.55 46.55 
Second 13.36 82.05 4.26 50.80 
Third 5.94 87.99 3.86 54.66 
Fourth 3.34 91.33 3.16 57.82 
Fifth 3.21 94.54 2.64 60.46 
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Table 5. Sovereign risk and corporate credit risk 
This table shows the effect of changes in sovereign credit risk on corporate credit risk. The dependent variable, 
log(CCDSijt)  is the weekly change in log corporate CDS spread. All models include firm fixed effects, time (week) 
fixed effects and the control variables described in Table A1. Column (2) also adds the lagged value of the dependent 
variable. Column (3) reports second-stage regression results for specification (1) where changes in country j 
sovereign credit risk, log(SCDSjt), are instrumented with changes in average sovereign credit risk of all other 
European countries, )SCDSΔlog( jt . Standard errors are two-way (country and week) clustered. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
Pooled 
OLS 
Dynamic 
Panel 
IV 
  (1) (2) (3) 
    log(SCDSjt) 0.049*** 0.057*** 0.082*** 
 
(0.015) (0.018) (0.023) 
log(CCDSijt-1)  
0.241*** 
 
  
(0.020) 
 
    
Firm FE Y Y Y 
Week FE Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y 
Observations 21,838 20,570 21,838 
Adj. R-squared 0.495 0.535 0.495 
Firms 118 118 118 
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Table 6. Sovereign risk and corporate credit risk: Government guarantees  
This table shows the effect of government guarantees on the spillover from sovereign risk to corporate credit risk. 
The dependent variable, log(CCDSijt), is the weekly change in log corporate CDS spread. Govti equals one if the 
firm is state controlled or it has been entirely or partially privatized. All models include firm fixed effects, time 
(week) fixed effects and the control variables described in Table A1. Interaction terms are between control variables 
and Govti as well as between time fixed effects and Govti. Column (2) also adds the lagged value of the dependent 
variable and its interaction with Govti. Column (3) reports second-stage regression results for specification (2) where 
changes in country j sovereign credit risk,log(SCDSjt), are instrumented with changes in average sovereign credit 
risk of all other European countries, )SCDSΔlog( j t . Standard errors are two-way (country and week) clustered. 
***
, 
**
, and 
* 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.   
 
 
Pooled 
OLS 
Dynamic 
Panel 
IV 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
   
() log(SCDSjt) 0.037** 0.038*** 0.040*** 
 
(0.015) (0.008) (0.007) 
() Govtilog(SCDSjt)    0.034*** 0.043* 0.075** 
 
(0.012) (0.022) (0.031) 
log(CCDSijt-1)  
0.213*** 
 
  
(0.026) 
 
    +  0.071 0.081 0.115 
  p-val Wald test + (<0.001) (0.002) (<0.001) 
    Firm FE Y Y Y 
Week FE Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y 
Interaction terms Y Y Y 
Observations 21,819 20,557 21,819 
Adj. R-squared 0.496 0.540 0.500 
Firms 115 115 115 
    
First stage diagnostics  
   
Kleinbergen-Paap LM stat 
  
4.413 
  p-val 
  
(0.036) 
Kleinbergen-Paap Wald stat 
  
7.060 
  p-val (t-test size>10%) 
  
(0.049) 
  p-val (t-test size>25%) 
  
(0.003) 
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Table 7. Sovereign risk and corporate credit risk: Strategic relevance  
This table shows effect of a firm’s strategic relevance on the spillover from sovereign risk to corporate credit risk. 
The dependent variable, log(CCDSijt), is the weekly change in log corporate CDS spread. Firms are considered of 
high strategic relevance (HMktCapi=1) if their average value for MktCapit is above the cross-sectional median. 
MktCapit is the ratio between the firm’s market capitalization and the total market capitalization of the country. All 
models include firm fixed effects, time (week) fixed effects and the control variables described in Table A1. 
Interaction terms are between control variables and HMktCapi as well as between time fixed effects and HMktCapi. 
Column (2) also adds the lagged value of the dependent variable and its interaction with HMktCapi. Column (3) 
reports second-stage regression results for specification (2) where changes in country j sovereign credit risk, 
log(SCDSjt), are instrumented with changes in average sovereign credit risk of all other European countries, 
)SCDSΔlog( j t . Standard errors are two-way (country and week) clustered. 
***
, 
**
, and 
* 
denote significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.   
 
 
 
 
Pooled 
OLS 
Dynamic 
Panel 
IV 
  (1) (2) (3) 
    
() log(SCDSjt) 0.032** 0.031** 0.042*** 
 
(0.013) (0.015) (0.001) 
() HMktCapilog(SCDSjt)   0.039** 0.055*** 0.066** 
 
(0.016) (0.015) (0.027) 
log(CCDSijt-1)  
0.212*** 
 
  
(0.014) 
 
    + 0.071 0.086 0.107 
   p-val Wald test + (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
    Firm FE Y Y Y 
Week FE Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y 
Interaction terms Y Y Y 
Observations 19,289 18,201 19,289 
Adj. R-squared 0.506 0.543 0.506 
Firms 100 100 100 
    
First stage diagnostics  
   
Kleinbergen-Paap LM stat 
  
5.037 
   p-val 
  
(0.025) 
Kleinbergen-Paap Wald stat 
  
6.029 
   p-val (t-test size>10%) 
  
(0.087) 
   p-val (t-test size>25%) 
  
(0.006) 
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Table 8. Sovereign risk and corporate credit risk: Domestic demand  
This table shows the effect of the concentration of sales in the domestic market on the spillover from sovereign risk 
to corporate credit risk. The dependent variable, log(CCDSijt), is the weekly change in log corporate CDS spread. 
We define firms as having high domestic sales (HSalesi=1) if their average value for Salesit is above the cross-
sectional median. Salesit is the fraction of sales in the country where the company is headquartered to total sales. All 
models include firm fixed effects, time (week) fixed effects and the control variables described in Table A1. 
Interaction terms are between control variables and HSalesi as well as between time fixed effects and HSalesi. 
Column (2) also adds the lagged value of the dependent variable and its interaction with HSalesi. Column (3) reports 
second-stage regression results for specification (2) where changes in country j sovereign credit risk, log(SCDSjt), 
are instrumented with changes in average sovereign credit risk of all other European countries, )SCDSΔlog( j t . 
Standard errors are two-way (country and week) clustered. 
***
, 
**
, and 
* 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
Pooled 
OLS 
Dynamic 
Panel 
IV 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
   
() log(SCDSjt)   0.005 0.007 0.003 
 
(0.015) (0.017) (0.016) 
() HSalesilog(SCDSjt)   0.071** 0.082** 0.108*** 
 
(0.033) (0.036) (0.036) 
log(CCDSijt-1)  
0.241*** 
 
  
(0.013) 
 
    + 0.076 0.089 0.111 
   p-val Wald test +=0 (0.004) (0.002) (<0.001) 
    Firm FE Y Y Y 
Week FE Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y 
Interaction terms Y Y Y 
Observations 16,709 15,767 16,709 
Adj. R-squared 0.509 0.548 0.509 
Firms 87 87 87 
    
First stage diagnostics  
   
Kleinbergen-Paap LM stat 
  
4.725 
   p-val 
  
(0.030) 
Kleinbergen-Paap Wald stat 
  
7.008 
   p-val (t-test size>10%) 
  
(0.051) 
   p-val (t-test size>25%) 
  
(0.003) 
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Table 9. Sovereign risk and corporate credit risk: Credit squeeze  
This table shows the effect of reliance on bank loans on the spillover from sovereign risk to corporate credit risk. The 
dependent variable, log(CCDSijt), is the weekly change in log corporate CDS spread. We define firms as having 
high bank exposure (HBanki=1) if their average value for Bankit is above the cross-sectional median. Bankit is the 
fraction of bank loans to total debt.  All models include firm fixed effects, time (week) fixed effects and the control 
variables described in Table A1. Interaction terms are between control variables and HBanki as well as between time 
fixed effects and HBanki. Column (2) also adds the lagged value of the dependent variable and its interaction with 
HBanki. Column (3) reports second-stage regression results for specification (2) where changes in country j 
sovereign credit risk, log(SCDSjt), are instrumented with changes in average sovereign credit risk of all other 
European countries, )SCDSΔlog( j t . Standard errors are two-way (country and week) clustered. 
***
, 
**
, and 
* 
denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
Pooled 
OLS 
Dynamic 
Panel IV 
  (1) (2) (3) 
    () log(SCDSjt)   0.019 0.030** 0.026* 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) 
() HBankilog(SCDSjt)   0.057** 0.051** 0.085*** 
 
(0.023) (0.022) (0.031) 
log(CCDSijt-1)  
0.268*** 
 
  
(0.023) 
 
    + 0.076 0.081 0.112 
   p-val Wald test +=0 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
    Firm FE Y Y Y 
Week FE Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y 
Interaction terms Y Y Y 
Observations 15,934 15,051 15,934 
Adj. R-squared 0.504 0.544 0.504 
Firms 83 83 83 
    
First stage diagnostics  
   
Kleinbergen-Paap LM stat 
  
4.555 
   p-val 
  
(0.033) 
Kleinbergen-Paap Wald stat 
  
6.593 
   p-val (t-test size>10%) 
  
(0.064) 
   p-val (t-test size>25%) 
  
(0.004) 
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Table 10. Sovereign risk and corporate credit risk: Refinancing risk  
This table shows the effect of refinancing risk on the spillover from sovereign risk to corporate credit risk. The 
dependent variable, log(CCDSijt), is the weekly change in log corporate CDS spread. We define firms as having 
high refinancing risk (HCurrenti=1) if their average value for Currentit is above the cross-sectional median. Currentit  
is the fraction of current to total debt. All models include firm fixed effects, time (week) fixed effects and the control 
variables described in Table A1. Interaction terms are between control variables and HCurrenti as well as between 
time fixed effects and HCurrenti. Column (2) also adds the lagged value of the dependent variable and its interaction 
with HCurrenti. Column (3) reports second-stage regression results for specification (2) where changes in country j 
sovereign credit risk, log(SCDSjt), are instrumented with changes in average sovereign credit risk of all other 
European countries, )SCDSΔlog( j t . Standard errors are two-way (country and week) clustered. 
***
, 
**
, and 
* 
denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  
 
 
Pooled 
OLS 
Dynamic 
Panel IV 
  (1) (2) (3) 
    () log(SCDSjt)   0.059*** 0.064*** 0.097*** 
 
(0.017) (0.019) (0.024) 
() HCurrentilog(SCDSjt)  -0.041** -0.033 -0.075*** 
 
(0.018) (0.020) (0.022) 
log(CCDSijt-1)  
0.243*** 
 
  
(0.023) 
 
    + 0.018 0.031 0.022 
   p-val Wald test +=0 (0.092) (0.003) (0.038) 
    Firm FE Y Y Y 
Week FE Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y 
Interaction terms Y Y Y 
Observations 19,374 18,282 19,374 
Adj. R-squared 0.502 0.539 0.502 
Firms 101 101 101 
    
First stage diagnostics  
   
Kleinbergen-Paap LM stat 
  
4.521 
   p-val 
  
(0.034) 
Kleinbergen-Paap Wald stat 
  
6.063 
   p-val (t-test size>10%) 
  
(0.086) 
   p-val (t-test size>25%) 
  
(0.006) 
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Table 11. Sovereign risk and corporate credit risk: Small vs large countries  
This table shows the effect of changes in sovereign credit risk on corporate credit risk and tests the spillover channels 
for large and small countries. The dependent variable, log(CCDSijt) is the weekly change in log corporate CDS 
spread. Smalli is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm is headquartered in Belgium, Finland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal or Spain. Di equals Govti in column (2), HMktCapi in column (3), HSalesi in column (4), 
HBanki in column (5), and HCurrenti in column (6). All models include local and idiosyncratic variables from Table 
A1, firm and time (week) fixed effects. Column (1) includes interaction terms of control variables and time fixed 
effects with Smalli, and columns (2)-(6) include interaction terms with Smalli and Di. The table reports second-stage 
regression results where changes in country j sovereign credit risk, log(SCDSjt), are instrumented with changes in 
average sovereign credit risk of all other European countries, )SCDSΔlog( j t . Standard errors are two-way (country 
and week) clustered. 
***
, 
**
, and 
* 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
  
  
Channel (Di) 
  
 
Govti HMktCapi HSalesi HBanki HCurrenti 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
() log(SCDSjt)   0.051*** 0.054*** 0.081*** 0.012* 0.050*** 0.077*** 
 
(0.012) (0.004) (0.022) (0.006) (0.017) (0.013) 
() Dilog(SCDSjt)    
0.034*** 0.009 0.072*** 0.032*** -0.038*** 
  
(0.011) (0.027) (0.014) (0.011) (0.009) 
() Smallilog(SCDSjt)   0.046 -0.033*** -0.119*** -0.029** -0.068*** 0.035** 
 
(0.035) (0.007) (0.013) (0.014) (0.010) (0.015) 
() DiSmallilog(SCDSjt)  
0.076*** 0.144*** 0.071*** 0.115*** -0.081*** 
  
(0.011) (0.015) (0.021) (0.020) (0.017) 
       + 
 
0.088 0.090 0.084 0.082 0.039 
   p-val Wald test +=0 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
+ 0.097 0.020 -0.038 -0.017 -0.018 0.112 
   p-val Wald test +=0 (0.004) (<0.001) (0.149) (0.167) (0.427) (<0.001) 
+ 
 
0.129 0.115 0.126 0.129 -0.007 
   p-val Wald test +=0 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.602) 
       Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Week FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Interaction terms Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 21,838 21,819 19,289 16,709 15,934 19,374 
Adj. R-squared 0.501 0.501 0.507 0.510 0.505 0.502 
Firms 118 115 100 87 83 101 
       
First stage diagnostics  
      
Kleinbergen-Paap LM stat 4.548 4.684 5.292 4.954 4.875 4.649 
p-val (0.033) (0.030) (0.021) (0.026) (0.027) (0.031) 
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Table 12. Robustness check (time-varying medians) 
This table shows the effect of transmission channels on the spillover from sovereign risk to corporate credit risk 
when firm sorts are based on time-varying medians. The dependent variable, log(CCDSijt) is the weekly change in 
log corporate CDS spread. A firm is considered of high strategic relevance in year t (HMktCapit=1) if its value for 
MktCapit in year t is above the year t cross-sectional median. HSalesit, HBankit, and HCurrentit are defined similarly. 
All models include local and idiosyncratic variables from Table A1, firm and time (week) fixed effects, and the direct 
effect of Dit. Interaction terms are between control variables (local and idiosyncratic) and Dit as well as between time 
fixed effects and Dit. The table reports second-stage regression results for specification (4) where changes in country 
j sovereign credit risk, log(SCDSjt), are instrumented with changes in average sovereign credit risk of all other 
European countries, )SCDSΔlog( j t . 
***
, 
**
, and 
* 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  
 
Channel (Dit) HMktCapit HSalesit HBankit HCurrentit 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      
() log(SCDSjt)   0.031*** -0.018 0.022*** 0.100*** 
 (0.004) (0.023) (0.005) (0.021) 
() Ditlog(SCDSjt) 0.080*** 0.154** 0.088*** -0.084*** 
 (0.029) (0.071) (0.028) (0.021) 
     
+ 0.110 0.136 0.110 0.016 
   p-val Wald test +=0 (<0.001) (0.006) (<0.001) (0.079) 
     
Firm FE Y Y Y Y 
Week FE Y Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y Y 
Interaction terms Y Y Y Y 
Observations 19,189 14,847 15,140 19,374 
Adj. R-squared 0.509 0.504 0.502 0.503 
Firms 100 87 83 101 
     
First stage diagnostics      
Kleinbergen-Paap LM stat 4.987 5.426 4.482 4.644 
  p-val (0.026) (0.020) (0.034) (0.031) 
Kleinbergen-Paap Wald stat 6.018 4.107 6.663 5.973 
  p-val (t-test size>10%) (0.088) (0.233) (0.062) (0.090) 
  p-val (t-test size>25%) (0.006) (0.033) (0.004) (0.007) 
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Figure 1. Sovereign and corporate credit risk 
The solid line represents the sovereign CDS spread and the dashed line the median CDS spread computed across 
non-financial reference entities headquartered in a country. 
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Figure 2. Correlation between sovereign and corporate credit risk 
Rolling correlation, computed over 52 weeks, between median log weekly changes in corporate CDS spreads and log 
weekly changes in sovereign CDS (solid line) with 90% confidence intervals (shaded area).  
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Figure 3. Principal component analysis: Loadings of first principal component 
The left panel shows loadings of the first principal component from the PCA on sovereign CDS spread changes. The 
right panel is a histogram of loadings of the first principal component from the PCA on corporate CDS spread 
changes.  
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Figure 4. Exposure to Eurozone countries. 
We define a firm exposure to other Eurozone countries as one minus the fraction (out of total sales) of domestic sales 
plus sales in non-EU countries. This figure depicts the cross-sectional distribution of firm-level averages of yearly 
values, together with the max/min range of yearly values. 
 
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
E
u
ro
z
o
n
e
 s
a
le
s
 o
v
e
r 
to
ta
l 
s
a
le
s
0 20 40 60 8010 30 50 70
min/max average
Eurozone sales
 49 
Figure 5. Firm characteristics. 
Cross-sectional distribution of firm characteristics, computed as firm-level averages of yearly values. MktCapi is the 
ratio between the firm’s market capitalization and the total market capitalization of the country. Salesi is the fraction 
of sales in the country where the company is headquartered to total sales. Banki is the fraction of bank loans to total 
debt. Currenti is the fraction of current to total debt. 
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